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INTRODUCTION 
Professors George and Guthrie have written a provocative 
article proposing radical changes to the Supreme Court.1 They 
propose increasing the size of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen 
Justices to increase the Court’s capacity. Of course, there is nothing 
sacrosanct about nine as the number of Justices. The size of the Court 
has varied from five to ten Justices over the course of American 
history. But there have been nine Justices ever since 1869, and a 
change after almost 150 years is would appear quite dramatic.2 
Even more significantly, Professors George and Guthrie propose 
having the Supreme Court hear cases in panels with the opportunity 
for en banc review in extraordinary cases. This would be 
unprecedented in the United States. There occasionally have been 
proposals for this type of change, but not for a long time and not with 
any serious chance of adoption.3 
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Law. I am grateful to the Duke Law Journal, and especially its Editor-in-Chief, Jeff 
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 1. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the 
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439 (2009). 
 2. Also, the intense controversy over the last effort to change the size of the Supreme 
Court—President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in the 1930s—likely has discouraged 
consideration of changing the size of the Supreme Court. For a discussion of Roosevelt’s 
proposal and the controversy surrounding it, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 255–56 (3d ed. 2006). 
 3. Professors George and Guthrie mention that this was proposed in 1869 and 1880. 
George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1460. There is no indication that in either instance this had a 
serious chance of adoption. 
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Professors George and Guthrie are correct in their premise that 
it is always desirable to rethink institutional design and that the 
Supreme Court largely has been immune from this type of scrutiny.4 
Yet change—and especially radical change—requires a compelling 
justification, a belief that no less drastic alternative would suffice, and 
a conviction that the reform would be desirable. I do not believe that 
Professors George and Guthrie’s proposal meets these requirements. 
In this Response, I thus address three questions in evaluating 
their proposal. First, have Professors George and Guthrie shown a 
problem that requires a solution? Second, if so, are there other ways 
to solve this problem that are less drastic? Third, would such a change 
be desirable? Finally, I conclude by offering some cautionary 
thoughts about empirical studies of judging behavior, especially when 
mere statistical descriptions form the basis for unjustified normative 
conclusions. 
I.  IS THERE A PROBLEM? 
The premise for the proposal by Professors George and Guthrie 
is that the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk dramatically. They are 
correct both in terms of the actual number of cases decided—235 in 
1930, 170 in 1945, 161 in 1985, and 67 in 2007—and in the percentage 
of petitions for certiorari that are granted.5 The harder question is 
assessing how much this is a problem. 
From the perspective of a lawyer who has had a number of 
seemingly meritorious petitions for certiorari denied, I find the 
decreased docket troubling. It is, by any measure, a great deal more 
difficult to get the Court to hear a case, even a case with a circuit split. 
From the perspective of a casebook author who has to prepare annual 
supplements,6 the longer opinions that have resulted from the smaller 
docket are very problematic. As the number of cases has gone down, 
the length of the opinions has gone up. Slip opinions are often over 
 
 4. A notable exception to this a 2006 proposal to limit the terms of Supreme Court 
Justices. See generally REFORMING THE COURT (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 
2006) (debating the desirability of tenure reform for Supreme Court Justices and exploring 
strategies to achieve term limits). 
 5. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1441. 
 6. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2008). 
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150 pages long.7 There is no way to edit an opinion that long into an 
assignment manageable for students in one night without making a 
hash of it. I have come to favor word and page limits being imposed 
on Supreme Court opinions. 
On the other hand, as I talk to judges and lawyers who practice 
in specialized areas, like bankruptcy and tax law, I hear praise for the 
smaller docket. From their perspective, the fewer Supreme Court 
decisions in their field the better, as the Court lacks expertise in these 
areas and its rulings are often perceived as engendering more 
confusion than clarity. 
My instinct is the same as Professors George and Guthrie’s that a 
larger docket would be desirable. But it is impossible to assess 
whether the smaller docket poses serious problems or how large a 
docket would be needed to make a difference. The impossibility of 
knowing how many more cases the Court would hear if it sat in panels 
as opposed to always being en banc complicates this assessment. In 
fact, Professors George and Guthrie emphasize that they are saying 
only that their proposal “could” increase the size of the docket, not 
that it would.8 
Professors George and Guthrie offer three primary advantages 
to their proposal and consequentially to a larger docket. First, they 
argue that the larger docket that would result from the Court acting 
in panels would decrease the conflicts among the federal circuits and 
the states. As they note, a primary function of Supreme Court review 
is to resolve these disagreements and thus to create uniform federal 
law.9 
This justification falls short because Professors George and 
Guthrie provide no basis for assessing whether the size of the docket 
is a serious problem in terms of the splits that exist in the lower 
courts. They offer no information as to the number of conflicts in 
decisions that exist, how long they last, or the extent to which their 
 
 7. For example, the slip opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. June 28, 2007), was 176 pages long, not counting the 
appendices. 
 8. Professors George and Guthrie write, “We intentionally say ‘could’ rather than 
‘would’ . . . . First, the Court’s docket is almost entirely plenary, and the Justices therefore 
would not be required to hear more cases than they currently hear. The dynamics of the 
certiorari process would influence the decision.” George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1460 n.94. 
 9. Supreme Court Rule 10(a) identifies a split among the lower courts as a ground for 
granting certiorari. 
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proposal would decrease conflicts. They are correct that conflicts in 
the interpretation of federal law are undesirable, but neither they nor 
any of the sources they cite provide any indication of the extent of the 
problem or how much using panels of Justices would solve this.10 Nor 
is it easy to measure the number of circuit splits or their duration. 
There is actually nothing but intuition that the problem has increased 
over time or that a larger docket would make much of a difference. 
The Court’s reasons for choosing to not take more cases presenting a 
split are complex, and the Court might continue to refuse to do so 
even if it had the capacity for a larger docket. 
Second, Professors George and Guthrie argue that increasing the 
size of the Supreme Court’s docket would lead to more error 
correction. They write: “[I]f the Court decided more cases, it would 
undoubtedly correct more errors committed by lower courts.”11 
But to speak of “errors” is to beg enormously difficult questions 
of how to assess what is “correct” as opposed to “erroneous.” Just 
because the Supreme Court reverses a federal court of appeals or a 
state’s highest court does not mean that the Supreme Court is right 
and the lower court is wrong. In the 2006 Term, twenty-four of the 
sixty-eight cases decided by the Supreme Court were resolved by a 5–
4 margin. It surely cannot be said that the five in the majority were 
correct whereas the four dissenters were in error. Even if the 
Supreme Court is unanimous in reversing a lower court, it does not 
mean that the lower court decision was erroneous. Unless one simply 
assumes that the Supreme Court is always right, it is impossible to 
believe that more decisions means more error correction. 
Moreover, even if one began with such an untenable assumption, 
increasing the size of the docket through using panels would not 
provide much more in the way of error correction. Professors George 
and Guthrie acknowledge this when they write, 
We of course are not asserting that the Supreme Court’s primary 
function is as a court of error correction. A single institution, even 
with panels, could not correct error in the more than 30,000 cases 
 
 10. Professors George and Guthrie discuss this at George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1448–
49. None of the sources in the footnotes on those pages discuss this. 
 11. Id. at 1447. 
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decided on the merits by the federal courts of appeals and the many 
more issued by state high courts.12 
Third, Professors George and Guthrie argue that the larger 
Supreme Court docket would increase “checks and balances.”13 They 
point to more than two thousand federal laws and almost a half 
million pages in the Federal Register during the Bush presidency.14 
They say that “[i]f the Court’s decisionmaking capacities expanded, it 
could play a much more prominent role in policing the actions of the 
other branches.”15 
But here Professors George and Guthrie assume that federal 
judicial review requires Supreme Court review. Even though the 
Supreme Court may hear relatively few cases, the lower federal courts 
are available to hear challenges to federal statutes or regulations and 
to decide any cases that pose questions of interpretation or validity. 
The number of federal laws and regulations says nothing about the 
need for Supreme Court review. Professors George and Guthrie offer 
no examples or evidence that the smaller docket is limiting the 
adequacy of checks and balances. 
The overall problem with Professor George and Guthrie’s 
argument is that they fail to present any way for assessing what is the 
ideal size of the Supreme Court’s docket. They have the intuition that 
a larger docket would be better, but offer neither a way to assess this 
claim nor any way for determining what the docket ideally should be. 
Without this analysis, it is simply impossible to determine whether 
having the Court sit in panels, and the increase in the docket that 
would result from it, is desirable. 
II.  ARE THERE LESS DRASTIC ALTERNATIVES? 
By any measure, Professors George and Guthrie argue for 
dramatic changes in the Supreme Court’s institutional structure: the 
first change in its size in nearly 150 years, making it two-thirds larger, 
and having it sit in panels for the first time in American history. Thus, 
it is reasonable to ask whether there are other, less radical ways to 
achieve the goal of increasing the size of the docket. 
 
 12. Id. at 1447 n.38. 
 13. Id. at 1451–52. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1452. 
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There are many other ways to increase the number of cases 
decided by the Supreme Court each year. First, the Court can simply 
choose, on its own, to hear more cases. There has been a great deal of 
discussion in recent years about the Court’s shrinking docket, and 
perhaps not coincidentally this year the Court has taken more cases. 
It is likely that there will be about eighty-five cases during October 
Term 2008, a third more than the sixty-seven cases decided the year 
before. Some Justices have said that they believe that a larger docket 
would be desirable.16 The Court can easily solve the problem of the 
dwindling docket by taking more cases each year. 
Second, Congress can expand the mandatory jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court by statute. At the beginning of American history, the 
Supreme Court’s docket was entirely mandatory. Over the course of 
American history, Congress has made even more of the Court’s 
docket discretionary.17 The most recent change occurred in 1988, 
when Congress made the Court’s entire appellate jurisdiction 
discretionary except for review of decisions by three-judge federal 
district courts. The decrease in the size of the docket is, in part, 
because of the elimination of almost all mandatory jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court. 
Congress could remedy this by mandating that the Supreme 
Court hear appeals in certain kinds of cases. Professors George and 
Guthrie suggest one possible way to achieve this: increase the use of 
certification of cases to the Supreme Court.18 Professors George and 
Guthrie suggest that the Supreme Court take more certified cases. 
Congress could create mandatory jurisdiction in these cases. The 
desirability of this is uncertain. Courts of appeals have no way of 
assessing the relative priority of cases on the Supreme Court’s docket 
or what case is the better vehicle for addressing a particular issue. My 
point is not to argue for greater mandatory jurisdiction, but rather, to 
suggest that it is a much less drastic way to increase the Court’s 
docket than having it decide cases in panels. 
 
 16. Professors George and Guthrie point out that Chief Justice Roberts said exactly this at 
his confirmation hearings. Id. at 1447. I also have heard Justices Breyer and Alito say this in 
comments at judicial conferences. 
 17. For a description of these changes, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 672–73 (5th ed. 2007). 
 18. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1450–51. 
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Third, other institutional structures could be developed to 
resolve splits among the circuits. In the 1970s, there were proposals 
for creating a new national court of appeals between the United 
States Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals.19 The 
primary justification offered for these proposals was to decrease 
unresolved splits among the circuits.20 This proposal, too, would be 
quite dramatic in establishing a new court and a new level of court, 
but because it would leave the Supreme Court untouched, it would 
not be perceived by the public or most lawyers as nearly as radical a 
change as that proposed by Professors George and Guthrie.21 
These suggestions are not exhaustive of the ways that the Court’s 
docket might be expanded. But they do indicate that there are many 
ways to achieve the goal without expanding the Court or having it sit 
in panels. 
III.  WOULD THE PROPOSAL BY PROFESSORS GEORGE AND 
GUTHRIE BE DESIRABLE? 
Even assuming that their proposal would achieve the benefits 
they identify, it still may carry significant, detrimental consequences. I 
have no sense as to whether fifteen rather than nine Justices would be 
better. As Professors George and Guthrie acknowledge, the number 
of Justices is inherently an arbitrary choice. They acknowledge, “We 
do not know how to calculate an ‘optimal’ number of Supreme Court 
Justices . . . .”22 
From the perspective of a lawyer who has argued several cases in 
the Supreme Court, I confess to worrying about what it would be like 
to face a bench of fifteen rather than nine. But I also know no way of 
 
 19. See, e.g., Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal 
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 208–47 (1975). 
 20. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 680–81. 
 21. The proposals for a new national court of appeals were tremendously controversial, 
and sitting and former Supreme Court Justices spoke out against them. See, e.g., Justice Brennan 
Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal “Fundamentally Unnecessary and Ill Advised,” 59 
A.B.A. J. 835, 836–38 (1973) (defending the screening function of the Supreme Court as its most 
important function and an essential feature of the Court); Earl Warren, Let’s Not Weaken the 
Supreme Court, 60 A.B.A. J. 677, 678–80 (1974) (arguing that a delegation of the Supreme 
Court’s powers would weaken the Court, politicize the judiciary, and actually add to the Court’s 
workload). 
 22. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1456. 
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determining whether fifteen Justices would be overall better or worse 
than nine. 
I, however, believe, however, that having the Supreme Court sit 
in panels rather than en banc would be very undesirable. A decision 
of a panel of Supreme Court Justices never will have the same 
legitimacy as a decision by the whole Court. Losing litigants and the 
public always will be left to wonder whether the result would have 
been different if only the luck of the draw had produced a different 
panel to hear the case. 
When I hear of a person arguing a case in a federal court of 
appeals, my first question always is, “Who is your panel?” When I 
argue a case in a federal court of appeals that reveals the panel’s 
composition in advance—the Ninth Circuit announces the panel a 
week before oral argument—I learn the identity of my panel as soon 
as I can. When I argue a case in a federal court of appeals that does 
not announce the panel until the day of the argument, like the Fourth 
Circuit, the first thing I do upon arriving at the court house is rush to 
the clerk’s office and learn my panel. This, is common behavior 
among appellate lawyers. 
I, and everyone, make judgments about the likely outcome based 
on the identity of the panel. Rarely has my prediction ever been 
wrong. In the summer of 2008, I argued a civil rights case in the Ninth 
Circuit that involved the death of three Latino teenagers as a result of 
a police officer mistakenly shooting at a moving car. I knew that I had 
little chance of winning when I saw that my panel was three very 
conservative judges. A friend who is a very experienced attorney, 
upon hearing of the panel, suggested that I let my ten-year-old 
daughter argue the case; that her chance of prevailing was no less 
than mine. After the oral argument, which went poorly, I told my 
friend that I should have let my daughter argue; the argument could 
not have gone worse for my side, she had a better chance of charming 
them, and when they were mean, she could have gotten away with 
kicking them in their shins. (I lost two weeks later in a two-page 
unpublished opinion.) 
I do not think that it would be desirable to have outcomes in the 
Supreme Court depend on the identity of the panel or be perceived as 
being a result of the luck of the draw. This inherently would lessen 
CHEMERINSKY IN MACRO 5/5/2009  4:21:25 PM 
2009] NO WARRANT FOR RADICAL CHANGE 1699 
 
the legitimacy and credibility of Supreme Court decisions.23 
Professors George and Guthrie respond to this by arguing that in only 
a small percentage of cases would the outcome be different with 
panels.24 First, in the cases that are 5–4—and remember that in 
October Term 2006 of sixty-eight cases, twenty-four were decided by 
a 5–4 margin25—the outcome really would depend on the accident of 
the panel. Second, and more importantly, lawyers and the public 
would understandably perceive that the result was the product of who 
was selected for the panel. Statistics showing that overall most cases 
would likely have come out the same with the full Court never would 
eliminate the sense in many cases that the result was the product of 
the panel. 
The panel’s decision would not have the same authority or 
legitimacy as decisions by the entire Court. The loss of legitimacy 
would be greatest at the beginning as lower courts, lawyers, 
academics, and the public became accustomed to panel decisions. But 
the loss of legitimacy would not simply be short-term; panel decisions 
never would have the credibility or legitimacy of decisions of the full 
Court. 
Professors George and Guthrie address this problem briefly at 
the end of their article.26 They assert that legitimacy is not a problem 
because the courts of appeals and foreign courts have legitimacy even 
though they sit in panels.27 But the problem with this argument is that 
it treats legitimacy as binary, as either existing or not existing. Of 
course, that is not correct. Legitimacy, however defined and 
measured, is surely a continuum. The relevant question is whether 
courts that sit in panels have the same legitimacy as courts that sit en 
banc. Put more precisely, the issue is whether sitting in panels would 
substantially decrease the Court’s legitimacy. Asserting that courts of 
appeals and foreign courts have legitimacy does not answer that 
 
 23. Many have written about the importance of the Court’s credibility and institutional 
legitimacy. See generally, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d 
ed. 1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s prudential values serve as limitations that protect 
the Court’s legitimacy). 
 24. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1464. 
 25. SCOTUSBlog, October Term 2006: Summary Information Regarding the Term, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/OT06SummaryInfo.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 
2009). 
 26. George & Guthrie, supra note 1, at 1472. 
 27. Id. 
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concern. There is no way to know whether these courts that sit in 
panels would have even more legitimacy if they sat en banc. Also, the 
authors fail to recognize the loss of legitimacy in shifting from a Court 
that for over two hundred years acted only en banc to one that sits in 
panels. 
Professors George and Guthrie offer another solution: the 
possibility of en banc review by the Supreme Court. But they find 
themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, if en banc review were 
rare and limited, then it could not solve the loss of legitimacy that 
would result from the vast majority of cases being decided by panels. 
On the other hand, if en banc review were frequent, then increasing 
the size of the Court and having panels would achieve little increase 
in the size of the docket and none of the benefits claimed by 
Professors George and Guthrie.28 
CONCLUSION 
This Symposium includes many wonderful papers on empirical 
research about judicial behavior. All describe aspects of how courts 
actually operate. But a cautionary note is necessary; there is a need to 
always carefully separate discussions of what “is” from what “ought 
to be.” Descriptions, even with the most sophisticated techniques, do 
not provide normative conclusions (though they can be the basis for 
normative analysis). Things can be measured—the size of the docket, 
the number of cases decided, the rate of agreement among judges, 
citation counts—but that does not necessarily mean that these 
measurements reveal anything useful and the descriptions are not 
normative in themselves. 
Yet it is so easy for the descriptive to slip into the normative. The 
paper by Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner, published in this 
Symposium, illustrates this point.29 They rank state court judges using 
three criteria—opinions produced, rate of disagreement with other 
judges of their party, and citation count. They label these counts 
 
 28. The very existence of the en banc procedure would take additional Court time and 
limit the additional capacity to hear more cases. It has to be assumed that litigants losing before 
a panel would frequently petition for en banc review. Scrutinizing these petitions would take 
time as would the en banc hearings and opinions. The more en banc proceedings there would 
be, the less there would be capacity for a larger docket. 
 29. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009). 
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“productivity,” “independence,” and “influence.” These terms have 
enormous normative content far beyond just calling the measures 
“opinions produced,” “rate of disagreement with judges of the same 
political party,” and “citation count.” Every judge wants to be 
deemed productive, independent, and influential. 
Yet Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner never defend their 
assessment in normative terms. Why should the number of opinions 
produced be seen as a measure of productivity rather than a function 
of the size of the docket and the norms for that court? A conservative 
Democrat or a liberal Republican might vote consistently differently 
from others of the same party, but why does that make the person 
more independent? Why assume a citation is necessarily the same as 
influence? 
Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner then rank the state courts 
and even individual judges using these measures. We are used to 
rankings in everything from football polls to U.S. News & World 
Report. Rankings take on a life of their own and are seen as a 
measure of quality. In other words, they take statistics, attach 
normative labels, and do rankings, sliding from descriptions to 
normative conclusions and never justify doing so. 
Empirical research about judging can be enormously valuable if 
it provides important insights into courts and judicial behavior. But 
empirical research can do great harm if it is assumed that something 
matters just because it can be measured and if it is allowed to 
substitute for careful normative analysis and arguments. 
